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I. INTRODUCTION
Starting in the mid-1980s and continuing, in increasing force, through
the 1990s, scholars began to vocally protest the ways in which highly
questionable "expert testimony" was routinely admitted into evidence in the
courts of the United States.1 Peter Huber' offered one of the most powerful
arguments that "the kind of expertise regularly accepted as admissible by
courts was, frankly, 'junk' of scandalous lack of dependability."' To address
the problem of "junk science" in the courtroom, the United States Supreme
Court decided Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.4 in 1993. In
it, the Court set forth a new standard for determining the admissibility of
scientific evidence in the federal courts of the U.S.' And, since the time
Daubert was decided, subsequent decisions of the Supreme Court have
extended Daubert's application to all expert testimony, not just that which is
technically "scientific." 6 The impact of Daubert, however, is not limited to
federal courts since many states have also adopted the Daubert test for the
admissibility of expert testimony.7
Since the time Daubert was decided, both courts and legal
commentators have voiced concerns that Daubert's focus on empirical
testability, scientific falsifiability, and reliability and validity (including an
assessment of error rates) may pose serious problems for expert testimony in
the forensic sciences. 8 The present study examines how Daubert has been
applied to cases in the post-Kumho era in which expert testimony concerning
forensic science has been offered in federal courts.
1. See, e.g., Richard H. Underwood, "X-Spurt" Witnesses, 19 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 343 (1995).
2. PETER W. HUBER, GALILEO'S REVENGE: JUNK SCIENCE IN THE COURTROOM (New York,
Basic Books 1991).
3. D. Michael Risinger, Navigating Expert Reliability: Are Criminal Standards of Certainty
Being Left on the Dock?, 64 ALB. L. REV. 99, 100 (2000) (citing HUBER, supra note 2).
4. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
5. Id. at 592.
6. Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
7. John Monahan, Violence Risk Assessment: Scientific Validity and Evidentiary Admissibility,
57 WASH & LEE L. REV. 901,911 (2000).
8. See generally, e.g., Jessica M. Sombat, Latent Justice: Daubert's Impact on the Evaluation of
Fingerprint Identification Testimony, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 2819 (2002) (citing United States v.
Llera Plaza, 179 F. Supp. 492 (E.D. Pa. 2002)); John Hein, When Reliable is Reliable Enough: The
Use of Expert Testimony After Kumho Tire v. Carmichael, 6 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 223, 238-41
(2001) (citing Deering v. Reich, 183 F.3d 645 (7th Cir. 1999); Kinser v. Gehl, 184 F.3d 1259 (10th
Cir. 1999)); Andrew 1. Gavil, Defining Reliable Forensic Economics in the Post-Daubert/Kumho
Tire Era: Case Studies from Antitrust, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 831, 867-75 (2000) (citing Concord
Boat Corp. v. Brunswick Corp., 207 F.3d 1039 (8th Cir. 2000)); Leonard J. Deftos, Daubert & Frye:
Compounding the Controversy Over the Forensic Use of DNA Testing, 15 WHIT71ER L. REV. 955
(1994).
II. LITERATURE REVIEW
A. Background on the Admissibility of Scientific Evidence
1. The Frye General Acceptance Test
At common law, the Frye test governed the admissibility of scientific
testimony.9  In Frye v. United States,'l "the court rejected scientific
testimony based on the use of a lie detector, stating that 'the thing from
which the deduction is made must be sufficiently established to have gained
general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs' in order to be
admissible."''
The purpose behind the Frye test was "to prevent ... the introduction
into evidence of specious and unfounded scientific principles or conclusions
based upon such principles." At the heart of Frye is the realization that the
expert witness is a hired gun.
"Whatever his credentials, publications, or affiliations, a scientist
who becomes the alter ego of a lawyer is no longer a scientist ....
So while a resume may be a necessary condition of expert
competence, it is never a sufficient one... . Science is likewise
defined by a community, not the individual, still less by a
resume ... [T]he cowl does not make a monk."'' 3
Despite the uniformity its followers argue the Frye rule provides, it
employs several terms that are open to differing interpretation. Who
comprises the relevant scientific community? After all, "[m]any scientific
techniques do not fall within the domain of a single academic discipline or
professional field."'14  What is general acceptance? Is it "wide-spread,
prevalent, [and] extensive, though not universal,"' 5 or is it "[agreement] by a
substantial section of the [relevant] scientific community?"'' 6 Perhaps,
however, the biggest problem with the Frye test is "that it often results in
excluding relevant, probative evidence and thereby impedes the truth-
seeking function of litigation."' 7
9. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 585.
10. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
11. Denise M. Dunleavy, Expert Testimony and the Charge of Junk Science, 451 PL1ILIT. 449,
451-52 (1992).
12. Paul C. Giannelli, The Admissibility Of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye v. United States, A
Half-Century Later, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1197, 1224 (1980) (citations omitted).
13. Peter Huber, Junk Science in the Courtroom, 26 VAL. U. L. REV. 723, 742-43 (1992).
14. Giannelli, supra note 12, at 1208.
15. United States v. Zeiger, 475 F.2d 1280 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
16. United States v. Williams, 443 F. Supp. 269, 273 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
17. N. Kathleen Strickland & Leah S. Elkins, A Current Assessment of Frye in Toxic Tort
Litigation, 446 PLI/Lrr. 321, 350 (1992) (citing United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1236 (3d
Cir. 1985)); see also Jack B. Weinstein, Improving Expert Testimony, 20 U. RICH L. REV. 473, 476
(1976).
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2. The Federal Rules of Evidence
Given the various problems associated with the Frye rule, it was
intentionally not incorporated into the Federal Rules of Evidence. 8 Instead,
the Federal Rules of Evidence opted for a more liberal approach to the
admissibility of scientific evidence. This more liberal approach was adopted
by some thirty-one states as of 1988.'9 Federal Rule of Evidence 702
provides, "If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist
the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a
witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training or
education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise. 2 °
Rule 703 requires that the facts or data relied upon in the formulation of an
expert opinion be of "a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the
particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject.' The
role of the Frye test after the adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence was
unclear until 1993 when the U.S. Supreme Court decided Daubert v. Merrell
Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.22 In Daubert, the Court set a new standard for
determining the admissibility of scientific evidence.
3. The Daubert Standard for Admissibility of Scientific Evidence
Daubert involved two children born with serious birth defects.23 Their
parents brought suit alleging the defects were caused by Bendectin®, an
antinausea drug produced by the predecessor companies to the Merrell-Dow
Pharmaceutical Company in the early 1950s.24 The drug was approved by
the Food and Drug Administration in 1956 as an antinausea drug. 5
Physicians frequently prescribed the drug for treatment of "morning-
sickness" in pregnant women between 1957 and 1983.26 In well over a
thousand cases since its availability in 1956, women have alleged that the
combination of dicyclomine hydrochloride and doxylamine succinate in
Bendectin® is teratogenic, that is, a substance that causes birth defects.27
Merrell Dow moved for summary judgment of the Daubert case
claiming Bendectin® did not cause birth defects and the plaintiffs would not
18. See Weinstein's Evidence, §§ 702.36 - 702.44.
19. Bert Black, Evolving Legal Standards for the Admissibility of Scientific Evidence, 239 Scl.
1508, 1512 n.I (1988).
20. Fed. R. Evid. 702.
21. Fed. R. Evid. 703.
22. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
23. Id. at 582.
24. Id.
25. Lynch v. Merrell-Nat'l Lab., 830 F.2d 1190, 1191 (1st Cir. 1987).
26. Id.
27. Id.
be able to proffer evidence to the contrary.28 To support their motion,
Merrell Dow introduced an affidavit by a well-credentialed epidemiologist
with an expertise in chemical exposure risk.2 9 The physician cited thirty
published studies on the subject, none of which concluded Bendectin
caused birth defects.3 °
The plaintiffs countered with eight well-credentialed experts of their
own who had conducted various studies, all of which demonstrated a causal
link between the product and birth defects.31  The District Court granted
Merrell Dow's motion for summary judgment. 32  Relying on the Frye
standard, it concluded the plaintiffs expert testimony was inadmissible
because it was not "sufficiently established to have general acceptance in the
field to which it belongs. 33 The case was appealed, and the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the summary judgment
stating that the reliability of a scientific technique must be "generally
accepted" by the relevant scientific community for it to be admissible.34 The
Supreme Court, however, vacated the judgment of the lower courts and
accepted the plaintiff's argument that the Federal Rules of Evidence
superseded the Frye test.35 The Court made clear that the critical concerns
of Rule 702 are evidentiary reliability and relevancy.36
The essence of the reliability standard lies within the Court's reference
to philosopher of science Karl Popper's statement that "the criterion of the
scientific status of a theory is its falsifiability, or refutability, or
testability.
In order to best ensure relevant and reliable testimony and exclude
"unsupported speculation," Daubert establishes a two-pronged test which
requires a district court to determine "whether the expert is proposing to
testify to (1) scientific knowledge that (2) will assist the trier of fact to
understand or determine a fact in issue., 38 This "gatekeeping" role calls for
the trial judge to make a "preliminary assessment of whether the reasoning
or methodology underlying the testimony is scientifically valid, [i.e.,
whether it is reliable]; and whether that reasoning or methodology properly
can be applied to the facts in issue," i.e., whether it is relevant to the issue
involved.3 9 Proffered scientific evidence must satisfy both prongs to be
admissible.40
28. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 727 F. Supp. 570, 571 (S.D. Cal. 1989).
29. Id at 575.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 573-74.
32. Id. at 576.
33. Id. at 572 (quoting United States v. Kilgus, 571 F. 2d 508, 510 (9th Cir. 1978)).
34. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 951 F.2d 1128, 1129-30 (9th Cir. 1991) (citing Frye v.
United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923)).
35. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 597-98 (1993).
36. Id. at 589.
37. Id. at 593 (quoting KARL POPPER, CONJECTURES AND REFUTATIONS: THE GROWTH OF
SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE 37 (5th ed. 1989)).
38. Id. at 592.
39. Joiner v. Gen. Elec. Co., 78 F.3d 524, 529-30 (1 th Cir. 1996).
40. Id. at 530.
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The first decision judges must determine, as gatekeepers, is whether a
witness is sufficiently qualified by "knowledge, skill, experience, training, or
education" to give expert testimony.41  This means a witness must be
qualified in the specific subject for which his testimony is offered. "Just as a
lawyer is not by general education and experience qualified to give an expert
opinion on every subject of the law, so too a scientist or medical doctor is
not presumed to have expert knowledge about every conceivable scientific
principle or disease. 42 The evaluation of an alleged expert's qualification in
his or her field is not a novel concept, and it is well within the abilities of our
capable federal judiciary.
Once a judge has decided a witness is qualified to serve as an expert,
Daubert requires the judge to make an independent assessment to "ensure
that any and all scientific testimony or evidence admitted is not only
relevant, but reliable. 3 This involves an examination of the methodology
underlying the expert opinion to determine whether it utilizes valid scientific
methods and procedures. Daubert suggests several factors to aid federal
judges in evaluating whether a particular scientific theory or study is
reliable: (1) its empirical testability; (2) whether the theory or study has been
published or subjected to peer review; (3) whether the known or potential
rate of error is acceptable; and (4) whether the method is generally accepted
in the scientific community. But these factors are neither exhaustive nor
applicable in every case."
This gatekeeping role is simply to guard the jury from considering as
proof pure speculation presented in the guise of legitimate scientifically-
based expert opinion. It is not intended to turn judges into jurors or
surrogate scientists. Thus, the gatekeeping responsibility of the trial courts
is not to weigh or choose between conflicting scientific opinions, or to
analyze and study the science in question in order to reach its own scientific
conclusions from the material in the field. Rather, it is to assure that an
expert's opinions are based on relevant scientific methods, processes, and
data, and not on mere speculation, and that they apply to the facts at issue.45
The Daubert standard was criticized in a variety of forums for a number
of reasons. Even upon remand, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals wrote:
[S]omething doesn't become "scientific knowledge" just because
it's uttered by a scientist; nor can an expert's self-serving assertion
that his conclusions were "derived by the scientific method" be
deemed conclusive .... As we read the Supreme Court's teaching
41. Fed. R. Evid. 702.
42. Whiting v. Boston Edison Co., 891 F. Supp. 12, 24 (D. Mass. 1995).
43. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589.
44. See, e.g., In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 35 F.3d 717, 750 (3d Cir. 1994).
45. Joiner, 78 F.3d at 530.
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in Daubert, therefore, though we are largely untrained in science
and certainly no match for any of the witnesses whose testimony we
are reviewing, it is our responsibility to determine whether those
experts' proposed testimony amounts to "scientific knowledge,"
constitutes "good science," and was "derived by the scientific
method. 46
The task before us is more daunting still when the dispute concerns
matters at the very cutting edge of scientific research, where fact meets
theory and certainty dissolves into probability. As the record in this case
illustrates, scientists often have vigorous and sincere disagreements as to
what research methodology is proper, what should be accepted as sufficient
proof for the existence of a "fact," and whether information derived by a
particular method can tell us anything useful about the subject under study.47
4. Daubert Expanded
In General Electric Co. v. Joiner, the U.S. Supreme Court made it clear
that a trial court's determination on the admissibility of expert testimony
under Daubert is to be given great deference on appeal. 48 Admissibility
decisions are to be overturned on appeal only if the trial court's decision was
an abuse of discretion.49 Initially, Daubert applied only to scientific
evidence, but in Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael,5 ° the Court held all expert
testimony that involves scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge
must meet the Daubert test for admissibility.5
Kumho has been praised by several scholars for numerous reasons, but
two reasons stand out in particular. The first is that the case gives a plain-
text meaning to Federal Rule of Evidence 702, because it does not
differentiate between "scientific," "technical," or "other specialized"
knowledge.52 The second, more important reason is that Kumho "eliminated
the trial judge's impossible task of differentiating between scientific and
non-scientific evidence. ' 53  But, as the next section will explain, the
46. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 43 F.3d 1311, 1315-16 (9th Cir.).
47. Id.
48. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner. 522 U.S. 136 (1997).
49. Id.
50. 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
51. Id. at 138.
52. Leslie Morsek, Get on Board for the Ride of Your Life! The Ups, the Downs, the Twists, and
the Turns of the Applicability of the "Gatekeeper" Function to Scientific and Non-Scientific Expert
Evidence: Kumho's Expansion of Daubert, 34 AKRON L. REV. 689. 721-22 (2001): C. WRIGHT & V.
GOLD. FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 6266, at 285 (1997) ("Nothing in the language of the
Rule suggests that scientific expert testimony should be treated differently from other expert
testimony").
53. Morsek. supra note 52, at 728 (citing Patricia A. Krebs & Bryan J. De Tray, Kumho Tire Co.
v. Carmichael: A Flexible Approach to Analyzing Expert Testimony Under Daubert, 34 TORT & INS.
L.J. 989, 995 (1999)); see also Michelle Michelson, Recent Development: The Admissibility of
Expert Testimony on Battering and its Effects after Kumho Tire, 79 WASH. U. L. Q. 367, 370 n.13
(2001) (comparing, e.g., Watkins v. Telsmith, Inc., 121 F.3d 984, 990-91 (5th Cir. 1997) (finding
application of Daubert not limited to scientific expert testimony), with Compton v. Subaru of Am.,
82 F.3d 1513, 1518-19 (10th Cir. 1996) (finding application of Daubert factors unwarranted "in
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elimination of this distinction by Kumho has raised some problems
concerning the admissibility of results from at least some of the fields
subsumed under the broad term "forensic sciences.
54
B. Implications for Forensic Science
Daubert has had a dramatic impact on the forensic sciences. For
example, forensic scientific evidence that had long been accepted by the
courts was reevaluated under Daubert and, in some cases, excluded.55 An
excellent example is the controversy caused by a federal district court's
exclusion of a positive identification using fingerprint analysis.
After a pre-trial Daubert hearing to consider the admissibility of
fingerprint evidence, Judge Louis Pollak excluded expert testimony
regarding fingerprints as unreliable. The court's January 7, 2002 decision in
United States v. Llera Plaza represented the first exclusion of fingerprint
evidence on reliability grounds in the history of fingerprints.56 While the
court ultimately reversed itself on March 13, 2002, the debate over the
admission of fingerprint evidence at trial is far from over.
5 7
One group of scholars criticized another court's acceptance of
fingerprint identification in the wake of Daubert by describing the opinion
as "an excellent, albeit deeply troubling, example of a court straining
scientific credulity for the sake of a venerable forensic science."58
Kumho's extension of Daubert to "technical" or "non-scientific" fields
has further muddied the waters since it does not explain how to determine
the reliability of expert testimony in such non-scientific fields. After all, the
Daubert factors were set forth by the Supreme Court for use in evaluating
scientific evidence. But many of the factors used to guide such evaluation,
cases where expert testimony is based solely upon experience or training"); Diana K. Sheiness, Out
of the Twilight Zone: The Implications of Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc... 69 WASH.
L. REV. 481. 491 (1994); Timothy B. Dyk & Gregory A. Castanias, Daubert Doesn't End Debate on
Experts, NAT'L L.J. 17, 20 (Aug. 2, 1993) (asking "Who is a scientist? A political scientist? A
'human factors expert'?").
54. See, e.g., D. Michael Risinger, Defining the "Task at Hand": Non-Science Forensic Science
After Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 767 (2000); Michael J. Saks,
Banishing Ipse Dixit: The Impact of Kumho Tire on Forensic Identification Science, 57 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 879, 882 (2000) ("There is no systematic, rigorous, empirical research on which the
forensic identification sciences' knowledge is built.").
55. Sombat, supra note 8. at 2822 (citing United States v. Llera Plaza, 179 F. Supp. 2d 492 (E.D.
Pa. 2002)).
56. United States v. Llera Plaza, 179 F. Supp. 492 (E.D. Pa. 2002).
57. Sombat, supra note 8, at 2822-23.
58. David L. Faigman et al., Legal Standards for the Admissibility of Scientific Evidence (Draft
Chapter of Forthcoming Second Edition of Modem Forensic Evidence: The Law and Science of
Expert Testimony) (A.L.I.-A.B.A. Course of Study, April 2001), WL SF78 ALI-ABA 33 (criticizing
the acceptance of fingerprint identifications in United States v. Havvard, 117 F. Supp. 2d 848, 849
(S.D. Ind. 2000), aff d, 260 F.3d 597 (7th Cir. 2001)).
such as peer review and known error rates, are difficult to apply to non-
scientific expert testimony.5 9
Consider the impact of Daubert-Kumho on handwriting analysis.
Several courts have already excluded handwriting analysis under Daubert,
while others continue to admit it, and still others limit the scope of testimony
to prevent positive identifications using handwriting analysis.60  The
continued reevaluation of the evidentiary value of forensic science evidence
by the courts leads one to wonder whether there will be ever-increasing
challenges to many types of forensic scientific evidence. 6' This concern is
especially palpable for those forensic scientific techniques that rely on
human comparisons for similarities (e.g., firearm and toolmark
identification, questioned document comparisons, hair and fiber
comparisons, etc.). 62  Similar concerns persist for the use of non-specific
forensic techniques such as the use of Luminol and phenolphthalein as
presumptive tests for the presence of blood even though they often yield
false-positive results.63
C. Purpose of the Present Study
Much of the scholarly literature concerning the application of Daubert
has been largely theoretical. In other words, scholarship has focused on
what Daubert should require and how it might affect certain disciplines. 64
Little attention has been paid to what the impact of Daubert has actually
been. The present study is an attempt to fill that void in the literature by
conducting a content analysis of both published and unpublished federal
judicial cases applying Daubert to an issue of forensic science since Daubert
was made applicable to all expert testimony by the Supreme Court's
decision in Kumho in 1999.
59. See, e.g., sources cited supra at note 53.
60. Sombat, supra note 8, at 2858 n.327 (citing United States v. Saelee, 162 F. Supp. 2d 1097
(D. Alaska 2001); United States v. Rutherford, 104 F. Supp. 2d 1190 (D. Neb. 2000) (limiting
handwriting evidence to objective comparison testimony); United States v. Van Wyk, 83 F. Supp. 2d
515 (D. N.J. 2000) (limiting handwriting expert testimony); United States v. Hines, 55 F. Supp. 2d
62 (D. Mass 1999) (excluding handwriting evidence involving an expert's opinion about the
identification of a writer)).
61. Id. (citing Andy Newman, Judge Rules Fingerprints Cannot Be Called a Match, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 11, 2002, at A14; Printing Errors, THE ECONOMIST, Jan. 19, 2002, at 66).
62. Terrence F. Kiely, The Houses of Deceits: Science, Forensic Science, and Evidence: An
Introduction to Forensic Evidence, 35 LAND & WATER L. REV. 397, 431 (2000) (citing F. Taroni, C.
Champod & P. Margot, Forerunners of Bayesianism in Early Forensic Science, 38 JURIMETRICS J.
183 (1998)).
63. Id. at 438 (citing Dale L. Laux, Effects of Luminol on the Subsequent Analysis of Bloodstains,
36 J. FORENSIC SCI. 1512 (1991); Fred E. Gimeno, Fill Flash Color Photography to Photograph
Luminol Bloodstain Patterns, 39 J. FORENSIC IDENTIFICATION 305 (1989); Ayers v. Arkansas, 975
S.W.2d 88 (Ark. 1998)).
64. See supra notes 52-53 and accompanying text.
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The research sample for this study consisted of all the federal judicial
opinions decided since Kumho was handed down in 1999 that applied the
Daubert test to some forensic scientific issue. This purposeful sample was
collected by conducting a search using Westlaw, a proprietary legal
database. Within Westlaw, the following search was run in the "ALLFEDS"
database:
DAUBERT & KUMHO & FORENSIC!
Accordingly, the search was designed to find all federal opinions, both
published and unpublished, citing Daubert and Kumho that contain either
"forensic" or "forensics." The search yielded a total of ninety judicial
opinions.
Of the ninety cases, seven cases were excluded because there were no
specific Daubert objections relating to the expert testimony,65 leaving a total
of eighty-three relevant cases. Within these cases, a total of 121 Daubert-
related issues were adjudicated. This higher number of claims is due to the
fact that many cases raised several Daubert-related forensic scientific issues.
When a case raised multiple issues, each issue was treated separately for the
purpose of conducting the content analysis. In other words, the specific
forensic scientific issues being subjected to a Daubert/Kumho analysis in a
case constitute the unit of analysis for this study, not the mere number of
cases. For this reason, cases frequently appear in more than one section of
the typology, depending on the substance of the various Daubert claims
adjudicated.
B. Data Exclusion
Of the 121 Daubert claims analyzed, twenty-eight were excluded from
this study, leaving a total of ninety-eight claims in the research sample that
were analyzed using qualitative content analysis techniques. The primary
reason why any given claim was excluded from the research sample was that
the claim at issue in the case did not involve forensic science. "[T]he
criterion of the scientific status of a theory," according to philosopher of
science Karl Popper and the United States Supreme Court's decision in
65. Weisgram v. Marley Co., 528 U.S. 440 (2000); United States v. Tabb, 13 Fed. Appx. 422,
2001 WL 747576 (7th Cir. 2001); Morgan v. Krenke, 72 F. Supp. 2d 980 (E.D. Wis. 1999); In re
Lake States Commodities, 272 B.R. 233 (N.D. Ill. 2002); In re Lake States Commodities, 271 B.R.
575 (N.D. Ill. 2002); United States v. Cooper, 91 F. Supp. 2d 79 (D.D.C. 2000); United States v.
Trala, 162 F. Supp. 2d 336 (D. Del. 2001).
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Daubert, "is its falsifiability, or refutability, or testability., 66  Although
under Kumho any expert testimony, whether it involves "science" or not, is
subject to the Daubert test, this paper is concerned with the applicability of
Daubert to forensic science. Claims not dealing with a Popperian notion of
what constitutes forensic science or those closely related to that definition
using generally accepted methods of applied technical forensic techniques
(e.g. fingerprinting and forensic accounting) are, therefore, beyond the scope
of this study. For example, Huey v United Parcel Service, Inc. dealt with a
"forensic vocational expert" who had been called by the plaintiff to support
a wrongful discharge claim. 67 The expert opined that the plaintiff had been
fired after having made statements that the defendants maintained a work
environment that was racially hostile.68 While certainly a valid basis for
expert testimony (and hence the type of evidence that Kumho mandates be
subjected to a Daubert analysis), a forensic vocational expert is not a
forensic scientist within the meaning of the term as used in this study.
Therefore, this claim, and seventeen others like it, were excluded from
analysis.69
The remaining ten of the twenty-eight claims excluded from this study
presented issues of forensic psychiatry or forensic psychology.7 ° While it
might be a debatable point whether the forensic behavioral sciences
constitute "science" with Popper's definition of the term, that
epistemological question was not the grounds for exclusion. The researchers
recognize the important contributions of the forensic behavioral sciences and
have, therefore, devoted an entire study of the ways in which Daubert has
been applied to issues of forensic psychiatry and psychology.7" To avoid
unnecessary duplication, no claims in the present study dealing with forensic
behavioral science were included in the research sample.
66. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 600 (quoting KARL POPPER, CONJECTURES AND REFUTATIONS: THE
GROWTH OF SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE 37 (5th ed. 1989)).
67. 165 F.3d 1084 (7th Cir. 1999).
68. Id. at 1086.
69. Id.; see also United States v. Allen, 269 F.3d 842 (7th Cir. 2001); Maiz v. Virani, 253 F.3d
641 (11 th Cir. 2001); Tlamka v. Serrell, 2002 WL 500651 (D. Neb. 2002); Katt v. City of N.Y, 151
F. Supp. 2d 313 (S.D.N.Y. 2001); Schieber v. City of Phila., 2000 WL 1843246 (E.D. Pa. 2000);
Meister v. Med. Eng'g Corp., 267 F.3d 1123 (D.C. Cir. 2001); Yarchak v. Trek Bicycle Corp., 2002
WL 1370634 (D.N.J. 2002); Lassiegne v. Taco Bell Corp., 202 F. Supp. 2d 512 (E.D. La. 2002);
Tolliver v. Naor, 2001 WL 1345735 (E.D. La. 2001); Ward v. Am. Med. Sys., Inc., 170 F. Supp. 2d
594 (W.D.N.C. 2001); Borgognone v. Trump Plaza, 2000 WL 341135 (E.D.N.Y. 2000). Some cases
raised multiple claims.
70. See United States v. Barnette, 211 F.3d 803 (4th Cir. 2000); Flores v. Johnson, 210 F.3d 456
(5th Cir. 2000); Lassiegne v. Taco Bell Corp., 202 F. Supp. 2d 512 (E.D. La. 2002); United States v.
Pendergraft, 120 F. Supp. 2d 1339 (M.D. Fla. 2000); Walker v. Consol. Rail Corp., 111 F. Supp. 2d
1016 (N.D. Ind. 2000); United States v. Duhon, 104 F. Supp. 2d 663 (W.D. La. 2000); Smith v.
Rasmussen, 57 F. Supp. 2d 736 (N.D. Iowa 1999); United States v. Huberty, 50 M.J. 704 (A.F. Ct.
Crim. App. 1999). Some cases raised multiple claims.
71. Henry F. Fradella, et al., The Impact of Daubert on the Admissibility of Behavioral Science
Testimony, 30 PEPP. L. REV. 403 (2003).
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C. Data Analysis and Coding
Each of the 130 claims was reviewed by three researchers and analyzed
using ethnographic content analysis. 72 This method is particularly
appropriate because multiple claims were reviewed in an attempt to discover
emergent patterns and differing emphases among and between the cases
reviewed. Consistent with the research method as set forth by Altheide,73
the research involves a focus on narrative data in which both categorical and
unique data were obtained from each case studied. Claims were then
classified based on the patterns that emerged during the analysis.
The content analysis was conducted in five phases. First, as described
above, seven cases in the purposeful sample that did not present a bona-fide
Daubert issue for some aspect of forensic science were discarded. In the
second phase of the research, the remaining eighty-three cases were
examined and the number of Daubert claims was quantified, yielding a total
of 121 claims. In the third phase, the contents of each of the claims were
studied by the researchers so that claims that were beyond the scope of the
study (i.e., the twenty-eight claims that were excluded in the previously
discussed manner) could be eliminated. In the fourth phase, the ninety-three
relevant claims presenting a forensic scientific issue being subjected to a
Daubert analysis were qualitatively analyzed.
Consistent with proper ethnographic content analysis methodology,74 the
comparing and contrasting of the ninety-three relevant claims without
predefined content analysis categories allowed for the emergence of central
themes. Claims that presented similar themes in applying Daubert were
grouped together. Seven primary themes emerged from this analysis,
allowing for the development of a typology of the way in which Daubert has
been applied to forensic science. These seven categories include: (1)
forensic accounting and economics; (2) forensic toxicology; (3) forensic
identification; (4) the forensic investigation of fire; (5) forensic physics; (6)
forensic pathology; and (7) forensic engineering. Whenever possible, sub-
categories within one of the seven main typology categories were also
created. For example, the forensic identification category was able to be
broken down into cases concerning fingerprint evidence, DNA evidence, and
other means of identification, like hair analysis or shoe imprint analysis.
In the fifth and final phase of the content analysis, the outcome of the
deciding court's Daubert analysis was classified as having been admitted,
excluded, or limited. Caution should be taken, however, not to assume that
exclusion of expert testimony on a particular issue necessarily means that the
expert was prohibited from testifying in toto. Many of the judicial opinions
72. DAVID ALTHEIDE, QUALITATIVE MEDIA ANALYSIS (Sage Publishing Co. 1996).
73. Id.
74. Id.
in the research sample failed to specify whether the issue being discussed
was the only topic of testimony for the expert. It is possible, therefore, that a
case in which testimony on a given issue was excluded for the reasons
explained in our typology may have admitted the testimony of the proffered
expert on some other point not adjudicated by the written opinion that
formed the data set for the present study's research sample.
IV. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
A. Forensic Accounting and Economics (N = 16; 17.2%)
A total of sixteen claims in the research sample involved Daubert
rulings on the admissibility of expert testimony by accountants. Two sub-
categories of claims emerged when analyzing these cases: testimony with
respect to fraudulent accounting and testimony regarding the calculation of
damages in civil lawsuits.
1. Fraudulent Accounting
In general, courts accept testimony by accountants regarding fraudulent
accounting practices so long as two criteria are met. First, the expert must
be a qualified accountant through education, skill, or experience.75 Second,
the accounting expert must adhere to generally accepted principles of
forensic accounting in conducting his/her analysis.7 6  When these basic
requirements of Daubert are met, the testimony of a forensic accountant is
welcomed by courts as is illustrated by the fact that six of the seven experts
proffered to give testimony regarding fraudulent accounting practices were
accepted by courts in this sub-category. The case of In re Bonham
77
illustrates the general rationale with regard to this type of testimony. The
court was trying to determine the existence of a Ponzi scheme7 ' by
reconstructing a debtor's disarrayed accounting records from a business that
involved selling airline tickets.7 9 Three experts were offered by the parties
in support of their respective positions.8 0  All three were accepted by the
court as being well-qualified experts in accounting practices, even though
not all were Certified Public Accountants ("CPA"). 81  The first expert, a
75. See supra notes 41-42 and accompanying text.
76. See supra notes 43-44 and accompanying text.
77. 251 B.R. 113 (D. Alaska 2000); see also ProtoComm Corp. v. Novell Advanced Servs., 171
F. Supp. 2d 473 (E.D. Pa. 2001); Maiz v. Virani, 253 F.3d 641 (1 lth Cir. 2001).
78. Ponzi schemes are a type of illegal pyramid scheme named for Charles Ponzi, who duped
thousands of New England residents into investing in a postage stamp speculation scheme back in
the 1920s. Ponzi thought he could take advantage of differences between U.S. and foreign currencies
used to buy and sell international mail coupons.... Decades later, the Ponzi scheme continues to
work on the "rob-Peter-to-pay-Paul" principle, as money from new investors is used to pay off
earlier investors until the whole scheme collapses. United States Sec. and Exch. Comm'n, Ponzi
Schemes (Sept. 19, 2000), available at http://www.sec.gov/answers/ponzi.htm.
79. In re Bonham, 251 B.R. at 117-31.
80. Id. at 118.
81. Id. at 131-32.
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non-CPA, had significant experience in reconstructive accounting by taking
poorly kept records and making sense of them. 82 The second expert was also
permitted to testify since he was a CPA and had significant experience in
reconstructive accounting.83 The third expert, however, was not permitted to
testify even though he was well-qualified. 4 The court found his testimony
to be based on substantial "factual mistakes, speculation, innuendo, and
inferences that [were not] supported by full explanations and analysis. ' ' 85 His
lack of vigorous examination was the deciding factor for the court in
determining that his testimony was inadmissible under Daubert.
86
2. Damage Calculations
Courts are more hostile to expert testimony with regard to the
calculations of damages than they are when dealing with testimony
concerning fraudulent accounting. This hostility manifests itself with
inconsistent rulings under Daubert. The inconsistency in judicial rulings in
this sub-category of claims appears to be due to judges having different
opinions with regard to whether a jury would be capable of determining a
specific amount for damages without assistance from an expert. In other
words, in the context of damage calculations, judges do not agree on the
interpretation of Federal Rule of Evidence 702, which mandates that expert
testimony "assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine
a fact in issue., 87 Application of the prescriptions of Rule 702 have resulted
in courts taking one of three approaches to damage calculation testimony.
Some courts, as illustrated by Smith v. Ingersoll-Rand Co.,88 allow
forensic accountants to testify generally regarding what should be included
in a jury's calculations for damages. They are similarly permitted to testify
about general practices for the actual calculation of damages (e.g., present
value compared to future value). But these experts are not permitted to
quantify damages for the jury. Some courts feel that an expert's offering of
specific amounts usurps the jury's function. Other courts feel there is a lack
of foundation for an expert to make specific damage calculations, especially
in wrongful death cases in which there is often no way of knowing how a
person's life would have progressed, thereby making damage calculations
speculative at best.8 9 But not all courts have followed this "middle of the
82. Id. at 132.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 136.
85. In re Bonham, 251 B.R. at 136.
86. Id. at 135-36.
87. Fed. R. Evid. 702.
88. 214 F.3d 1235 (10th Cir. 2000).
89. Schieber v. City of Philadelphia, 2000 WL 1843246 (E.D. Pa. 2000); Saia v. Sears Roebuck
& Co., 47 F. Supp. 2d 141 (D. Mass. 1999).
road" approach. Some courts prohibit any testimony from forensic
accountants or economists on the issue of damages calculations.9" In stark
contrast to such an outright ban, other courts welcome such testimony. 9'
Even when forensic accounting or economics experts are permitted to
testify with regard to the calculation of damages, yet another inconsistency
was found concerning the types of evidence upon which a damages expert
may rely in forming an opinion. For example, in Schieber v. City of
Philadelphia,92 a forensic accounting expert was prohibited from testifying
with regard to damages because the expert's calculations were exclusively
based upon information provided by the father of a decedent about whom
the wrongful death case was being litigated.93 The court found this
methodology to be unreliable since the father, as the person who would
financially benefit from the verdict, was biased.94 But in a remarkably
similar case, a court permitted a forensic account to testify with regard to an
award of damages using calculations the expert made based upon
information provided by the decedent's mother. 95 Although the mother's
projections of her economic losses may not have been a particularly sound
basis for the expert's assumptions, the court ruled this shortcoming went
more to the weight to be accorded the expert's testimony, rather than
forming a sufficient basis for excluding it.
9 6
B. Forensic Toxicology (N = 11; 11.8%)
Eleven of the claims in the research sample involved the use of expert
testimony with regard to an issue of forensic toxicology. 97 Interestingly,
most of these claims concern questions about the proper use or scope of
toxicological evidence, rather than the admissibility of any particular
technique. Ostensibly, this is due to the fact that true toxicological analysis
is done in a laboratory by a skilled scientist using standard techniques of
analytic chemistry on samples obtained via a proper chain of custody.98
Presuming these fundamental prerequisites under Daubert are met, one
would expect the results of nearly all forensic toxicological testing to be
admissible. Where courts appear to be struggling is with respect to how the
results of forensic toxicological technique should be used once admitted. 99
90. E.g., Voilas v. Gen. Motors Corp., 73 F. Supp. 2d 452 (D.N.J. 1999).
91. Maiz v. Virani, 253 F.3d 641 (11 th Cir. 2001); EFCO Corp. v. Symons Corp., 219 F.3d 734
(8th Cir. 2000); Smithers v. C&G Custom Module Hauling, 172 F. Supp. 2d 765 (E.D. Va. 2000);
Coleman v. Dydula, 139 F. Supp. 2d 388 (W.D.N.Y. 2001); Walker v. Yellow Freight Sys., 1999
WL 757022 (E.D. La. 1999).
92. 2000 WL 1843246 (E.D. Pa. 2000).
93. Id.
94. id. at "5.
95. Walker v. Yellow Freight Sys.. 1999 WL 757022 (E.D. La. 1999).
96. Id. at *8.
97. See supra Section III.A. for the description of research methodology utilized.
98. See Cooper v. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings, 150 F.3d 376 (4th Cir. 1998) (excluding expert
testimony since he was not a toxicologist and had no knowledge beyond general chemistry of
forensic toxicology).
99. Compare United States v. Green, 55 MJ. 76 (C.A.A.F. 2001) with United States v. Powe,
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Virgin Islands v. Carelal'° nicely illustrates two principles that seem in
perfect accord with the intent of Daubert.'0 ' First, results from properly
maintained and calibrated instruments analyzing breath alcohol levels are
admissible as direct evidence of intoxication.' °2 Second, results from a
police-administered and interpreted field sobriety test may not be used as the
basis of a forensic toxicologist's opinion regarding a specific blood alcohol
concentration. 0 3  However, such field sobriety test results may be
introduced through the testimony of the administering police officer as
circumstantial evidence of intoxication, so long as no specific levels of
blood alcohol concentration are deduced from the test.'14
Rulings are less consistent when it comes to the interpretation of drug
test results insofar as what elements of a crime the results prove, as
illustrated by a comparison of United States v. Green0 5 with United States v.
Powe.10 6 Both were criminal cases in which defendants were convicted of
drug use charges based on the results of toxicological tests.0 7 It was
undisputed in both cases that the test results demonstrated the use of a
controlled substance. 10 8 But, these two cases differed as to whether such
results were sufficient to show "knowing use" of the given substances.' ° 9 In
Green, expert testimony regarding the results of a urinalysis test was held to
be sufficient to establish all elements of the substantive offense so long as
the laboratory methods used were reliable and yielded results indicated the
presence of the drug or its metabolite above a standard cutoff level."0 So
long as the specific metabolite relied upon for analysis was not naturally
produced by the body or by another substance, the court held that its
presence as detected in the urinalysis test was sufficient to establish both use
of the drug (the actus reus of the offense) and the mens rea requirement of
scienter (i.e., knowing use) without any supplemental testimony."' The
dissent in the case, however, echoed the holding in Powe, both of which
argued that more evidence than toxicological test results was needed to
establish the criminal intent element of knowledge." 2 Thus, it appears that
2000 WL 703684 (N.M. Ct. Crim. App. 2000) (The cases differed as to whether toxicology results
were sufficient to show certain elements of the crime.).
100. 2001 WL 1825823 (V.I. 2001).
101. Id.
102. Id. at *1I.
103. Id. at *4.
104. Id. at *8; see also United State v. Horn, 185 F. Supp. 2d 530, 533 (D. Md. 2002).
105. 55 M.J. 76 (C.A.A.F. 2001).
106. 2000 WL 703684 (N.M. Ct. Crim. App. 2000).
107. See Green, 55 M.J. at 77; Powe, 2000 WL 703684 at *1.
108. Powe, 2000 WL 703684 at *2; Green, 55 M.J. at 79.
109. Powe, 2000 WL 703684 at *5; Green, 55 M.J. at 81.
110. Green, M.J. at 81-85.
111. Id. at 81-85.
112. Id. at 87: see also Powe, 2000 WL 703684 at *5.
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some courts are misapplying Daubert in assuming that the admissibility of
forensic toxicological test results can establish the mens rea element of an
offense when, in fact, such results go to the actus reus element.
The remaining six claims all demonstrate the difficult time courts have
when determining the admissibility of evidence in toxic tort cases when
experts attempt to testify regarding a causal link between toxicological
exposure and a particular illness."l 3 Louderback v. Orkin Exterminating Co.,
Inc.114 illustrates the way most courts deal with toxicological causation
evidence under Daubert/Kumho."5 A neuro-psychologist was being offered
in Louderback to testify that the plaintiffs' exposure to chlorpyrifos caused
physical and psychological illnesses. 16 Consistent with the mandate of
Daubert, the court permitted the expert to testify about the extent and
duration of the plaintiffs' illnesses, but would not allow him to offer any
opinions relating to the causation of those illnesses since he was not a
toxicologist.' The difficulty in the case, however, concerned the testimony
of a medical doctor who was board-certified in toxicology.1 18 The court
permitted this expert to testify that the plaintiffs' exposure to chlorpyrifos
caused the alleged illnesses over the objections of the defense that the expert
lacked sufficient expertise with chlorpyrifos." 9 The court felt this objection
was an "overly constrictive view of the requirements of Rule 702.,,120 It
appears the key element underlying the court's rationale for admitting the
testimony had to do with the fact that he was a board-certified physician.1
2
'
In other toxic tort cases, courts have been much more hesitant to admit
similar testimony by an expert who is not a medical doctor. For example, in
Plourde v. Gladstone, 22 the court did not permit an expert to testify that
exposure to herbicides caused illness in the plaintiffs and their livestock. 23
Yet, the expert at issue had earned a Ph.D. in toxicology. 24 In spite of this
credential, the court felt it was an insufficient basis for testimony on illness
causation since the expert was not a medical doctor.
125
It is unclear from a review of the few cases in the research sample if
judges are confused about the scope of a toxicologist's expertise, or whether
they are simply biased-whether consciously or not-in favor of physicians
with expertise in toxicology as being the proper expert to opine with respect
to causation of illnesses stemming from toxic exposure.
113. Plourde v. Gladstone, 190 F. Supp. 2d 708 (D. Vt. 2002); Amorgianos v. Nat'l R.R.
Passenger Corp., 137 F. Supp. 2d 147 (E.D.N.Y. 2001).
114. 26 F. Supp. 2d 1298 (D. Kan. 1998).
115. See id.
116. Id. at 1301.
117. Id. at 1302.
118. Id. at 1303-07.
119. Id. at 1307.
120. Id. at 1302.
121. See id. at 1305.
122. 190 F. Supp. 2d 708 (D. Vt. 2002).
123. Id. at 720-24.
124. Id. at 719.
125. Id. at 719-20.
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C. Forensic Identification (N = 25; 26.9%)
There were twenty-five Daubert claims regarding experts testifying on
forensic identification practices. 26  Because there are many different
methods of identification, these claims were broken down into sub-
categories. As a generalization, though, courts overwhelmingly accept




The application of Daubert to fingerprint identifications has caused
much controversy. 128 Although all eight challenges to the admissibility of
fingerprint identification evidence ultimately resulted in the admission of the
fingerprint evidence, this result occurred only after much public outcry after
a federal district judge ruled such evidence inadmissible under Daubert, and
then reversed his own opinion.1
29
In United States v. Llera Plaza, the court decided that the ACE-V
(analysis, comparison, evaluation, and verification) method of fingerprint
identification was not fully admissible because it did not satisfy the majority
of the criteria for admissibility under Daubert 30 Although the court agreed
fingerprint analysis had gained general acceptance within the American
fingerprint examiner community, it considered this an insufficient basis to
warrant full admissibility of fingerprint identifications since general
acceptance was only one of the five Daubert factors to be considered when
determining the admissibility of expert testimony. 3 '
At the outset, it should be noted that the court stressed the importance of
referring to fingerprint evidence as "technical" rather than "scientific" - a
distinction that has more symbolic than practical importance in light of
Kumho since under it, all expert testimony, whether "scientific, technical, or
other specialized knowledge,"' 132 must be scrutinized under Daubert 33 The
court then went on to apply each of the other Daubert criteria. 34 First, the
126. See supra section III.A. for description of research methodology.
127. See generally Joan Griffin & David LaMagna, Daubert Challenges to Forensic Evidence:
Ballistics Next on the Firing Line, 26 OCT CHAMP 20 (2002).
128. See generally Jessica M. Sombat, Latent Justice: Daubert's Impact on the Evaluation of
Fingerprint Identification Testimony, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 2819 (2002).
129. See United States v. Llera Plaza, 179 F. Supp. 2d 492 (E.D. Pa. 2002) [hereinafter Llera
Plaza I].
130. Id. at 515.
131. Id. at 515-16.
132. FED. R. EvID. 702.
133. Scheiber, 2000 WL 1843246 at *2.
134. Llera Plaza L, 179 F. Supp. 2d at 506-09, 516.
court concluded fingerprint evidence failed the testability factor because no
objective criteria existed to prove or disprove the ultimate conclusion. 135
Next, despite the fact that Kumho had expanded Daubert to apply to
technical evidence, the court determined the peer review factor applied
exclusively to the evaluation of a scientific community. 3 6  Since
fingerprinting does not belong to a specific scientific community, the court
concluded that true peer review was not possible, and thus that Daubert
factor weighed against the admissibility of fingerprint evidence.137 The
court concluded there was insufficient reliable data regarding the error for
fingerprint identification and, therefore, surmised this lack of the known
error rate weighed against the admissibility of fingerprint evidence.138
Finally, the court determined there was a lack of controlling standards
when evaluating fingerprint identification evidence for three reasons., 39 The
first controlling standard that was lacking had to do with the qualifications
of fingerprint examiners because there was no formal requirement for
certification or formal training for anyone to be a fingerprint exam-tiner.' 4°
The second controlling standard the court determined was lacking had to do
with the fact that there was no agreement on the number of matching points
that need to be found between two prints before a "match" is declared by the
fingerprint examiner.' 4' Finally, the court found that because the ultimate
determination of whether two fingerprints came from the same person is
based upon the subjective opinion of an examiner, this too constituted a lack
of controlling standards that weighed against the admissibility of fingerprint
evidence for positive identification purposes.
142
Given the court's Daubert analysis, it held that testimony would be
admitted when offered by
fingerprint examiners who, suitably qualified as "expert" examiners
by virtue of training and experience ... (1) describe how the rolled
and latent fingerprints at issue in this case were obtained, (2)
identify and place before the jury the fingerprints and such
magnifications thereof as may be required to show minute details,
and (3) point out observed similarities (and differences) between
any latent print and any rolled print the government contends are
attributable to the same person. What such expert witnesses will not
be permitted to do is to present "evaluation" testimony as to their
"opinion" (Rule 702) that a particular latent print is in fact the print
of a particular person...13
135. Id. at 506-509, 516.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 509, 516.
138. Id. at 509-13, 516.
139. Id. at 513.
140. Id. at 514.
141. Lera Plaza 1, 179 F. Supp. 2d at 513.
142. Id. at 513-14.
143. Id. at 516.
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Two months after the decision in Plaza I was issued, the court reversed
itself.'" The court heard testimony of an FBI agent who explained the
three-day training course through which FBI fingerprint examiners go in
order to become certified to testify in court. 145 The agent also explained the
very low error rate enjoyed by FBI-certified practitioners. 4 6 This testimony
convinced the court that its initial conclusions regarding the error rate and
controlling standards factors of the Daubert test were incorrect. 147 The court
also determined it had made a mistake when it decided the conclusions of
fingerprint examiners should be excluded due to their subjectivity because
qualified experts in other fields are often permitted to give their subjective
opinions so long as they are drawn from reliable data gathered from reliable
methods. 48 The court also expanded its view on the peer review and general
acceptance factors, stating that general acceptance in a technical field should
not be discounted, especially when such general acceptance is international
in scope as evidenced by the long-standing acceptance of the ACE-V
method in other common law courts. 1 4 9 Given the change of heart on these
factors, although the court still expressed concern about the
testability/falsifiability factor, it determined that this concern, when balanced
against the other factors, did not warrant exclusion of positive fingerprint
identification under Daubert.' 50
Some critics of the Lera Plaza I decision contended it spawned a new
wave of sub-litigation in which defense attorneys have been contesting
fingerprint evidence.' 5' But so far, this has not materialized. No court has
granted a motion to exclude fingerprint evidence as unreliable under
Daubert. 152 Courts continue to receive fingerprint identification evidence
using the rational offered by the court in Llera Plaza H.
In several cases, however, trial judges have held, over the
prosecutor's objection, that the defendant could present expert
testimony at trial regarding the scientific bankruptcy of the field.
144. United States v. Llera Plaza, 188 F. Supp. 2d 549 (E.D. Pa. 2002) [hereinafter Llera Plaza 11].
145. Id. at 555-57.
146. Id. at 557.
147. Id. at 564-72.
148. Id. at 563-64.
149. Id. at 563-64.
150. Id. at 571-72.
151. See Robert Epstein, Fingerprints Meet Daubert: The Myth of Fingerprint "Science" Is
Revealed, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 605, 606 (2002).
152. Id. at 649-50; see also United States v. Turner, 285 F.3d 909 (10th Cir. 2002) (admission of
fingerprint testimony was harmless error); United States v. Havvard, 260 F.3d 597 (7th Cir. 2001)
(admitting fingerprint identification evidence as expert testimony); United States v. Mitchell, 199 F.
Supp. 2d 262 (E.D. Pa. 2002) (holding that solicitation regarding fingerprint technology was not
material); United States v. Salim, 189 F. Supp. 2d 93 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (fingerprint evidence satisfied
Daubert requirements); United States v. Reaux, 2001 WL 883221 (E.D. La. 2001) (motion to
exclude fingerprint testimony denied).
Moreover, in a number of other cases where challenges were filed,
prosecutors have sought to avoid litigation of this issue altogether,
either by coming forward with a much improved plea offer, or by
withdrawing the fingerprint evidence from the case. Accordingly,
from the defense point of view, there have been some significant
benefits from challenging fingerprint evidence.153
2. Other Forensic Identification Practices
In much the same way that fingerprint identification evidence is
universally accepted in federal courts under Daubert, the same is true for
other well-established types of identification evidence. As with all expert
testimony, a qualified expert must have conducted the analysis at issue using
an accepted methodology. 54 Assuming the Daubert threshold requirements
are met, then experts are permitted to give their opinions regarding the
source of evidence in question, so long as they do so within the limitations
of the technique at issue.1 55 For example, identifications based on footwear
impressions or hair comparisons are admissible under Daubert so long as the
ultimate conclusion is framed within the respective class characteristic
limitations. 156  In other words, a particular footprint or hair sample "is
consistent with" or "could be" a match with a particular suspect.
57
Individualization is only proper with techniques designed to allow for
individualization, such as forensic DNA analysis.5 8
One forensic identification case, United States v. Pollard,'59 presented a
rather unique fact pattern in which the court allowed an expert to give an
opinion regarding the age of a child in a pornographic video in order to
determine whether the child was a minor. 160 The defense objected that the
physician had relied upon the Tanner Scale of Human Development to make
an age determination.' 6 ' The Tanner Scale is designed to estimate sexual
maturity, not a child's chronological age. 62 Consider this editorial in the
journal Pediatrics in which the creator of the Tanner Scale criticized the use
of the scale to estimate chronological age:
This is a wholly illegitimate use of Tanner staging: no equations
exist estimating age from stage, and even if they did, the degree of
unreliability in the staging [of] the independent variable would
introduce large errors into the estimation of age, the dependent
variable. Furthermore, the unreliability of the stage rating is
153. Epstein, supra note 151, at 650.
154. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590; FED. R. EVID. 702, 703.
155. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590.
156. See United States v. Allen, 208 F. Supp. 2d 984, 985 (N.D. Ind. 2002).
157. See id. at 986; see also United States v. Santiago, 156 F. Supp. 2d 145 (D.P.R. 2001).
158. United States v. Trala, 162 F. Supp. 2d 336 (D. Del. 2001); Santiago, 156 F. Supp. 2d 145.
159. 128 F. Supp. 2d 1104 (E.D. Tenn. 2001).
160. Id. at 1107.
161. Id. at 1113.
162. Id. at 1115-16.
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increased to an unknown degree by improperly performed staging,
that is, not at a clinical examination but through nonstadardized
[sic] and, thus, unsuitable photographs.
Therefore, we wish to caution pediatricians and other
physicians to refrain from providing "expert" testimony as to
chronological age based on Tanner staging, which was designed for
estimating development or physiologic age for medical, educational,
and sports purposes, in other words, identifying early and late
maturers. The method is appropriate for this, provided chronologic
age is known. It is not designed for estimating chronologic age and,
therefore, not properly used for this purpose.
63
The court, however, allowed the physician to testify since he had other
qualifications to make his determination as to the child's age and only used
the Tanner Scale as a supplemental tool.' 64
3. Handwriting Analysis
The court's rationale in Llera Plaza I is very similar to the rationale
offered as the basis for most courts excluding identifications based on
handwriting analysis. Of the eleven Daubert claims contesting the
admissibility of handwriting analysis evidence, six experts were permitted to
testify under limitations; three were permitted to testify without limitations;
and two were excluded. The complete exclusions occurred only in cases in
which the proffered expert lacked sufficient expertise under Rule 702.165
Thus, the inconsistency in applying Daubert to handwriting analysis
concerns the scope of the testimony.
The majority of the courts in the research sample have limited
handwriting analysis experts such that they are only permitted to testify
regarding the "physical mechanics and characteristics of handwriting" and
"similarities between the questioned documents and defendant's known
exemplars."'166  Thus, the majority approach is to prohibit experts from
163. Arlan L. Rosenbloom & James Tanner, Misuse of Tanner Puberty Stages to Estimate
Chronological Age, 102 PEDIATRICS 1494 (1998).
164. Pollard, 128 F. Supp. 2d at 1123.
165. United States v. Paul, 175 F.3d 906 (1 1th Cir. 1999) (excluding a lawyer from testifying as to
handwriting identification); United States v. Fujii, 152 F. Supp. 2d 939 (N.D. Ill. 2000) (excluding a
handwriting analysis expert for lack of expertise in dealing with Japanese handprinting).
166. United States v. Hernandez, 42 Fed. Appx. 173, 175 (10th Cir. 2002); see also United States
v. Rutherford, 104 F. Supp. 2d 1190 (D. Neb. 2000) (rejecting handwriting expert opinion as to
authorship of allegedly forged documents.); United States v. Van Wyk, 83 F. Supp. 2d 515 (D.N.J.
2000) (allowing expert to testify as to similarities and differences but not authorship of unknown
documents.); United States v. Santillan, 1999 WL 1201765 (N.D. Cal. 1999) (limiting testimony to
mechanics and characteristics of handwriting); United States v. Hines, 55 F. Supp. 2d 62 (D. Mass.
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testifying with regard to their opinion whether there are sufficient
similarities between questioned documents and known samples to conclude
they are a "match," leaving that determination to be made by the jury. Yet,
other courts take a much more lenient look at handwriting analysis experts
and permit them to testify regarding their ultimate conclusions as to whether
someone was or was not the author of a specific document. 167 For example,
in United States v. Paul,1 68 a qualified handwriting expert was permitted to
opine his ultimate conclusion after giving specific testimony as to the
similarities and differences between the questioned document and the
defendant's writing sample. 69 The fact that the defendant had misspelled
several words in his handwriting exemplar the same way the words were
misspelled in the questioned document appears to have been a strong factor
in influencing the court's decision to permit the ultimate identification
testimony.170
D. Fire Science (N = 5; 5.4%)
Three cases in the research sample dealt with the admissibility of expert
testimony regarding the origin of a fire.'17 In these three cases, a total of five
experts were proffered to provide opinions regarding either the location of a
fire's origin or the cause of a fire. Of these five, only two were permitted to
testify, both in the same case.'72 Unfortunately, the court did not describe
the scope of the expert testimony in its written opinion, nor did it explain its
reasoning for admitting the expert testimony under Daubert.'73 Therefore,
the focus of the analysis in this section is on the three claims which were
excluded or limited by Daubert.
Weisgram v. Marley Co. 1 7 4 is a good example of how courts welcome
fire origin testimony but are limiting the scope of such testimony in light of
Daubert's strictures to those who are qualified experts who conduct an
investigation using the standard methods of fire science investigation.'75
Weisgram involved a townhouse that had allegedly caught fire as a result of
a defective baseboard heater. 76 The local captain of the fire department
conducted the initial investigation into the origin of the fire. 177 He ruled out
1999) (allowing expert testimony regarding similarities and differences but not authorship of
unknown document).
167. Paul, 175 F.3dat 911; United States v. Gricco, 2002 WL 746037 (E.D. Pa. 2002); United
States v. Elmore, 56 M.J. 533 (N-M Ct. Crim. App. 2001).
168. 175 F.3d 906 (11 th Cir. 1999).
169. Id. at 911.
170. Id. at 909.
171. Weisgram v. Marley Co., 169 F.3d 514 (8th Cir. 1999) (holding expert witness testimony as
to fire's origin unreliable; Knotts v. Black & Decker, Inc., 204 F. Supp. 2d 1029 (N.D. Ohio 2002);
Tolliver v. Naor, 2001 WL 1345735 (E.D. La. 2001) (allowing expert witness testimony).
172. 2001 WL 1345735.
173. Id.
174. 169 F.3d 514 (8th Cir. 1999).
175. Id. at 517 n.3.
176. Id. at 516.
177. Id. at 518.
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careless smoking on a sofa as the cause of the fire since he "saw no smoking
materials in the home and because he did not think the burn pattern in the
sofa indicated that the fire began as the result of careless smoking.'
78
Instead, it was his opinion that the fire had started near the baseboard
heater. 79 While such testimony was deemed proper on appeal given the fire
chief's expertise as to fire cause and origin, the court ruled that his testimony
should have been limited to that opinion.' 80 But the trial court had permitted
the fire chief to opine that the fire had started because of "a malfunction of
the heater,"'' even though the fire chief admitted he was " 'not an electrical
expert' . . . and that he did not 'know what happened with the heater."" 82
The plaintiff in Weisgram also offered another expert who the trial court
had accepted as a "fire investigator" and "technical forensic expert."' 83 The
court's opinion did not identify what qualified him as either of these but did
mention the expert was a certified "master electrician."' 84 Yet, this expert
did not conduct an investigation as to the cause of the fire for himself; all he
did was offer an opinion based on the information the fire chief had provided
to him. 185 The appeals court ruled that the admission of his testimony was in
error and remanded the case with instructions to enter judgment as a matter
of law for the defendant-appellants.
8 6
E. Forensic Physics (N=4; 4.3%)
Courts welcome expert testimony regarding both bullet matching and
bullet trajectory, often commenting on how helpful such testimony is to the
trier of fact in understanding the often complicated issues involved in
forensic physics. 18 7 However, courts will disallow such testimony if the
proffered expert lacks the proper qualifications. For example, in Gates v.
City of Memphis, 8 the plaintiff appealed the exclusion of an expert it had
offered to testify about the level of threat another officer would likely have
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Weisgram, 169 F.3d at 518.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 519.
184. Id.
185. Id. at519-20.
186. Weisgram, 169 F.3d at 522.
187. United States v. Santiago, 199 F. Supp. 2d 101, 1Il- 12 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) ("The Court... can
only imagine the number of convictions that have been based, in part, on expert testimony regarding
the match of a particular bullet to a gun seized from a defendant or his apartment."); Smithers v. C &
G Custom Module Hauling, 172 F. Supp. 2d 765, 771 (E.D. Va. 2000) ("The 'science' of
momentum analysis and the related theories at issue in this case are well-tested, commented upon,
verified, and accepted").
188. 2000 WL 377343 (6th Cir. 2000) (affd, 210 F.3d 371 (Table)).
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entertained prior to shooting and killing someone approaching a marked
police car with a drawn gun. 8 9 This opinion was based, in part, on the
expert's trajectory analysis of bullets discharged at the scene.' 90 But the
person on whom the defense relied for this opinion evidence was a former
police officer who, in the words of the court, had "never received a block of
training specifically devoted to trajectory analysis,"' 9' but instead had been
trained in the investigation of shooting scenes. Since he was being called to
testify specifically about trajectory analysis, the court ruled his background
in shooting scene investigation was an insufficient basis for qualification.' 92
Even if a court finds that an expert of forensic physics is qualified to
give an opinion, the expert must still use proper methods in forming the
basis of that opinion.' 93 Failing to do so will result in exclusion under
Daubert as illustrated by Smithers v. C & G Custom Module Hauling.
94
The plaintiff in Smithers had been involved in an automotive accident.' 95 He
called an expert in "momentum analysis" to testify regarding the pre-impact
speed of the defendant's vehicle in order to establish the defendant's
speeding as the proximate cause of the accident. 96 The court excluded the
expert based on the following reliability issues:
The "science" of momentum analysis and the related theories at
issue in this case are well-tested, commented upon, verified, and
accepted. However, the Court does not have sufficient confidence
that such theories were properly applied by the Plaintiffs expert to
the facts of this case in order to admit his various opinions,
especially as concerns the all-important issue of the pre-impact
speed of the defendant's vehicle. Among the Court's concerns is the
fact that [the expert] effectively discounts several variables that may
not have made a difference in the ultimate outcome of his analysis,
but his discounting of them (which was fatal in the opinion of the
defense expert) creates enough of a doubt as to the overall reliability
of [his] ultimate opinions as to render them inadmissible .... In
addition, [he] could not provide an acceptable explanation for his
failure to consider the fact that the two vehicles traveled together at
an angle after impact.' 97
There was only one case in the research sample that concerned an issue
of physics other than ballistics or momentum analysis. That case, Rushing v.
Kansas City S. Ry. Co.,' 98 concerned the physics of sound. The defendants
189. Gates, 2000 WL 377343 at **3.
190. Id.
191. Id. at *3.
192. Id. at *3-*4.
193. Smithers, 172 F. Supp. 2d at 771.
194. 172 F. Supp. 2d 765 (E.D.Va. 2000).
195. Id. at 768.
196. Id. at 769-70.
197. Id. at 771-72 (emphasis in original).
198. 185 F.3d 496 (5th Cir. 1999).
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had constructed a railroad switching yard approximately fifty-five feet from
the plaintiffs' home.' 99 Although an acoustical noise barrier was constructed
to mitigate noise emissions that might disturb area residents, the plaintiffs
brought suit alleging it was insufficient and, accordingly, the switchyard
constituted a private nuisance. 200 The defendants retained an industrial
audiologist to take and analyze noise measurements at the switchyard. 20 1 It
was the expert's opinion that "the sound emissions originating in the yard
complied with federal regulations promulgated pursuant to the Noise Control
Act. 2 °2  Since the audiologist was qualified through his educational
background and experience, and since he followed the prescribed testing
methods necessary to ensure reliable results, the expert was permitted to
testify that the switching yard complied with all federal noise regulations.2 3
This resulted in partial summary judgment for the defendants, which was
later upheld on appeal.2°
F. Forensic Pathology (N = 4; 4.3%)
Both criminal and civil cases frequently rely on pathological testimony
to establish cause, manner, mechanism, and time of death.205  Courts
regularly admit such opinions so long as the expert is properly qualified and
uses standard autopsy procedures to arrive at his/her opinion.0 6 But courts
have become more vigilant in limiting the testimony of forensic pathologists
to opinions that are strictly within their scope of expertise, as illustrated by
Schieber v. City of Philadelphia.0 7 In Schieber, a woman was gagged,
raped, and murdered-in her own apartment.20 8 Presumably while the attack
was taking place, a neighbor called 911.209 Two officers responded to the
call, but after knocking on the victim's door and receiving no response, they
simply left having made no other attempt to investigate the call or to enter
the apartment.210 The woman's body was later discovered by family
members who subsequently sued the city of Philadelphia for the way in
which the police handled the 911 phone call.2 '
199. Id. at 502.
200. Id.
201. id.
202. id. at 502.
203. Id. at 502, 507.
204. Id. at 507.
205. See generally DOMINIC J. DIMAIO & VINCENT J.M. DIMAIO, FORENSIC PATHOLOGY (2d ed.,
CRC Press 2001).
206. See, e.g., Deering v. Reich, 183 F.3d 645 (7th Cir. 1999).
207. 2000 WL 1670888 (E.D. Pa. 2000).





The testimony of a forensic pathologist was critical to establishing
causation in the plaintiff's case. The court, finding the pathologist was a
qualified expert who used reliable methods in reaching his conclusions,
allowed the forensic pathologist to give several key pieces of opinion
evidence.2  He was permitted to opine that he believed the victim would
have still been alive at the time the police officers arrived at the apartment;
had they forced the door open, the pathologist believed the victim would
have been capable of being resuscitated by police. 3 The pathologist was
also permitted to testify as to his belief that a gag had been placed in the
victim's mouth which would have prevented her from calling out at the time
the police arrived.1 4 This opinion was based on "physical evidence of
mouth injuries, including bruising and a 'bite mark type laceration of the
tongue.' 215 The court, however, did not permit the pathologist to testify
"that the mouth pressure applied was intended to prevent [the woman] from
calling out for help and was sufficient for that purpose only., 21 6 The court
reasoned that not only was this beyond the pathologist's expertise, but also
that there was no scientific basis for such a conclusion.2 17
Verzwyvelt v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. 2 18 is another case in which
the scope of an otherwise qualified forensic pathologist's testimony was
limited. The plaintiff brought suit alleging the victim had died from eating
sausage meat contaminated with listeria.2 9 The court permitted the coroner
to testify, consistent with the autopsy report, that the cause of death was
"more probably than not ... a bacterial infection., 220 The coroner, however,
did not test specifically for the listeria bacteria, but in fact, conceded he "did
not know the type or nature of the bacterial infection' ' 221 and that he had
"little or no scientific knowledge concerning listeria, listeria infections, or
the subfield of hematopathology. 222 Accordingly, the court prevented the
coroner from testifying as to any opinion regarding the cause or nature of the
bacterial infection that was presumably the cause of death.223
G. Forensic Engineering (N = 28; 30.1%)
All of the cases that fall into the category of forensic engineering
involve claims of defects in a variety of products. The overwhelming
212. Id. at *4.
213. Id. at *4.
214. Id. at *5.
215. Id.
216. id.
217. Id.; see also Tlamka v. Serrell, 2002 WL 500651 (D. Neb. 2002) (permitting a forensic
pathologist to testify regarding cause of death and whether life-saving measures would have
prevented it, but disallowing testimony regarding whether proper or improper CPR procedures had
been used).
218. 175 F. Supp. 2d 881 (W.D. La. 2001).
219. Id. at 881.
220. Id. at 882.
221. Id. at 883.
222. Id. at 886.
223. Id. at 887-88.
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number of cases in this category deal mainly with allegations of design
defects, but manufacturing defects and other types of defects are also
common. Each of these three subtypes of forensic engineering claims is
analyzed separately given the common themes found in each subtype.
1. Design Defects
Thirteen cases raised sixteen issues pertaining to a defect in a product's
design, ranging from nail guns and ladders to bike seats and automotive fuel
systems.224  Most of the time, the experts involved in these cases are
mechanical engineers.225  But neither Rule 702 nor Daubert requires an
academic degree for someone to be a qualified expert.226 Thus, in some
cases, a non-engineer with relevant expertise may be accepted by the court
as was the case in Tolliver v. Naor.2 7 The plaintiffs were injured when their
car was struck from behind by another vehicle. 2 8 They alleged their injuries
were worsened by a series of factors, among which was a defect in the
vehicle's fuel system which caused it to burst into flames after impact. 29
The defense sought to exclude the plaintiffs automotive fuel system design
expert under Daubert because he was "not an engineer and ha[d] never taken
a college-level engineering course.' 230  The court permitted the expert to
testify even though he was not a licensed engineer because more than thirty
years of experience in the automotive industrial design industry qualified
him to give an opinion. 231 The Tolliver case, however, is the exception not
the rule. 32 Courts are vigilant about excluding the testimony of non-
qualified experts as illustrated by Kinser v. Gehl Co.
233
224. Lauzon v. Senco Prods., 270 F.3d 681 (8th Cir. 2001); Smith v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 214 F.3d
1235 (10th Cir. 2000); Kinser v. Gehl Co., 184 F.3d 1259 (10th Cir. 1999); Weisgram v. Marley Co.,
169 F.3d 514 (8th Cir. 1999); Yarchak v. Trek Bicycle Corp., 2002 WL 1370634 (D.N.J. 2002);
Knotts v. Black & Decker, Inc., 204 F. Supp. 2d 1029 (N.D. Ohio 2002); Shanks v. Home Depot,
Inc., 2001 WL 1837829 (W.D. Mich. 2001); Tolliver v. Naor, 2001 WL 1345735 (E.D. La. 2001);
Rapp v. Singh, 152 F. Supp. 2d 694 (E.D. Pa. 2001); Lauzon v. Senco Prods., 123 F. Supp. 2d 510
(D. Minn. 2000), rev'd 270 F.3d 681 (8th Cir. 2001); Padillas v. Stork-Gamco, Inc., 2000 WL
1470210 (E.D. Pa. 2000); Clark v. R.D. Werner Co., 2000 WL 666380 (E.D. La. 2000); Jarvis v.
Ford Motor Co., 69 F. Supp. 2d 582 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
225. See, e.g., Tolliver v. Naor, 2001 WL 1345735 (E.D. La. 2001) (utilizing one expert with a
bachelor's degree in mechanical engineering).
226. FED. R. EvID. 702; Daubert v. Merrell-Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
227. 2001 WL 1345735 (E.D. La. 2001).
228. d. at *1.
229. Id.
230. Id. at *3.
231. Id. at *4.
232. See also Fee v. Brass Eagle, Inc., 2002 WL 1465762 at *6 (N.D. Ohio. 2002) (allowing
testimony regarding alleged defects in a paintgun from a non-engineer who had over thirty years of
experience in "forensic analyses of firearms, firearms operation, tool mark identification, and
firearm repair.").
233. 184 F.3d 1259 (10th Cir. 1999).
Kinser was a product liability lawsuit in which a farmer was killed when
he was operating a baler and became entangled in the machine.3 Although
there were no witnesses to the accident, the surviving family members
sought to prove their wrongful death case by offering an expert who
theorized the farmer "was either attempting to unplug the baler or fix the
automatic tying mechanism. '235 In either scenario, the farmer would have
been within inches of the baler's pick-up tines.236 If the farmer had "lost his
footing" at that time, he would have been "pulled into the machine. 237 In
addition to believing the baler contained insufficient warnings regarding the
risk of such injuries, the expert also claimed the baler was defectively
designed since a number of modifications could have been made to improve
upon its safety. 38 Although the expert appeared to the court to be qualified
in the realm of product safety and warnings, his credentials did not qualify
him to testify on possible alternative designs for the baler.239 The court
reasoned:
The expert has no practical experience in mechanical design. He
focuses solely on concepts and has no expertise with respect to the
design of products under a traditional engineering method. He has
never published a single paper examining any type of agricultural
equipment, never operated a big round baler, and, excluding this
case, never consulted on behalf of a plaintiff or manufacturer
regarding big round balers. In fact, other than familiarizing himself
with the deposition testimony of three farmers, [the expert] ha[d]
neither investigated nor spoken with any individual regarding their
experience with big round balers. 2 °
Kinser is representative of a number of cases in which an expert's
testimony was excluded for lack of proper expertise.241
When an expert is properly qualified to give an opinion on design
defects, courts welcome their testimony so long as the expert's investigation
and conclusions are based upon reliable methodologies. Yarchak v. Trek
Bicycle Corp.24 2 is a good example. The plaintiff was a police officer who
was required to ride a bicycle as part of his patrol responsibilities. 2 43 After
doing so for a while, he began to experience problems maintaining an
erection. 244 He eventually filed a lawsuit in which he claimed a defectively
234. Id. at 1259.
235. Id. at 1265.
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Id. at 1266.
239. Kinser, 184 F.3d at 1271.
240. Id. at 1271.
241. See also Weisgram v. Marley Co., 169 F.3d 514 (8th Cir. 1999); Clark v. R.D. Werner Co.,
2000 WL 666380 (E.D. La. 2000): Jarvis v. Ford Motor Co., 69 F. Supp. 2d 582 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
242. 208 F. Supp. 2d 470 (D.N.J. 2002).
243. Id. at 470.
244. Id. at 477.
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designed bicycle seat was the cause of his problem.245 To prove his case, he
sought to introduce the testimony of a forensic engineer with expertise in
both accident reconstruction and in biomechanics to support the allegation
that a bicycle seat was defective because it failed to warn users of its risk of
causing erectile dysfunction in male riders.246 The expert was offered to
establish causation, specifically that the bike seat was capable of causing
"erectile difficulties., 247 The expert's opinion was based upon a variety of
factors including an examination of the bicycle at issue, a photograph of the
subject bicycle, the owner's manual for the bicycle, advertising brochures
for the bicycle and those like it from the same manufacturer, and the
plaintiff's medical records (which contained documentation of the plaintiffs
visits to several medical specialists, some of whose notes suggested a causal
link between his erectile dysfunction and his bicycle riding),2 48 His opinion
was also based, in part, on the report of a physician who specialized in
erectile dysfunction who had examined the plaintiff.249  The physician
concluded that "prolonged periods of persistent pressure from the bicycle
seat caused enduring damage to [p]laintiff's perineal arteries, restricting the
flow of oxygen-carrying blood to [p]laintiff's genitals, and preventing
[p]laintiff from achieving and maintaining an erection., 250 He arrived at this
diagnosis using the methodology of "differential diagnosis"-ruling out
other potential causes of the plaintiff's problem such as "diabetes,
neurological disease, or high blood pressure" that might explain impotency
in young males. 25 ' Not only did the court approve of the physician's use of
the differential diagnosis methodology,252 but also the court approved of the
forensic engineer's reliance on this report in coming to his opinion regarding
the defective design of the bicycle seat.2 53 In contrast to Yarchak, when
qualified experts are not using reliable methodologies, courts have no
hesitation excluding their opinions.254
245. Id. at 478.
246. Id. at 496-97.
247. Id. at 499.
248. Id. at 500.
249. Id. at 496.
250. Id. at 496-97.
251. Id. at 497.
252. Id. at 498.
253. Id. at 501-02; see also Lauzon v. Senco Prods., 270 F.3d 681 (8th Cir. 2001); Smith v.
Ingersoll-Rand Co., 214 F.3d 1235 (10th Cir. 2000); Shanks v. Home Depot, Inc., 2001 WL
1837829 (W.D. Mich. 2001); Tolliver v. Naor, 2001 WL 1345735 (E.D. La. 2001); Padillas v. Stork-
Gamco, Inc., 2000 WL 1470210 (E.D. Pa. 2000).
254. See Kinser v. Gehl Co., 184 F.3d 1259 (10th Cir. 1999); Weisgram v. Marley Co., 169 F.3d
514 (8th Cir. 1999); Knotts v. Black & Decker, Inc., 204 F. Supp. 2d 1029 (N.D. Ohio 2002);
Shanks v. Home Depot, Inc., 2001 WL 1837829 (W.D. Mich. 2001); Rapp v. Singh, 152 F. Supp. 2d
694 (E.D. Pa. 2001); Padillas v. Stork-Gamco, Inc., 2000 WL 1470210 (E.D. Pa. 2000); Clark v.
R.D. Werner Co., 2000 WL 666380 (E.D. La. 2000); Jarvis v. Ford Motor Co., 69 F. Supp. 2d 582
(S.D.N.Y. 1999)
Sometimes judges have a difficult time understanding how to apply
Daubert correctly in the design defect area as illustrated by Lauzon v. Senco
Products, Inc.2 55 The plaintiff in Lauzon, a carpenter, sued the creators of a
bottom-fire pneumatic nail gun alleging a defect in the gun's design
permitted an extra nail to be fired from the gun unexpectedly which resulted
in injury to the plaintiff. 2 6 The court did not permit the plaintiff's forensic
engineer to testify for the following reasons. 7 First, the expert was unable
to test his theory of design defect by duplicating the events of the
accident.2 58 Second, he was also unable to rule out other accident theories
other than the lack of a manufacturing defect.25 9 Third, the expert's theory
regarding the cause of the accident had "never been subjected to peer
review, nor [had] it been published. 260  Without the opinion of the
plaintiffs forensic engineer, there was a lack of evidence to support the
plaintiffs claim, so summary judgment was entered in favor of the
defendant.261 The plaintiff appealed on the basis that the district court erred
in excluding the expert under Daubert.
262
On appeal, the court reversed the exclusion the forensic engineer. 63
Even though the expert was unable to duplicate the events of the accident,
his testing still provided insight as to how the accident may have occurred.26 4
Moreover, the appellate court took issue with the trial court's dismissal of
several articles, one of which had been authored by the expert in question,
that supported the plaintiffs theory of the case. 265 This suggested it had at
least been peer reviewed, and perhaps even accepted in the relevant
scientific community. 266 The appellate court also took issue with the district
court's problem regarding the expert's inability to rule out other theories of
the incident since the ability to do so is not required under Daubert.267 The
case was reversed and remanded with instructions to admit the testimony of
the expert.268
2. Design and Manufacturing Defects
Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael,269 the landmark case which was
responsible for extending Daubert to all types of expert testimony, not just
255. Lauzon v. Senco Prods., 123 F. Supp. 2d 510 (D. Minn. 2000), rev'd, 270 F.3d 681 (8th Cir.
2001).
256. Id.
257. Id. at 513.
258. Id. at 512.
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. ld. at 513-14.
262. Lauzon v. Senco Prods., 270 F.3d 681 (8th Cir. 2001).
263. Id.
264. Id. at 689.
265. ld. at 690-91.
266. Id. at 69 !.
267. Id. at 693-94.
268. Lauzon, 270 F.3d at 696.
269. 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
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those concerned with scientific opinion, was a design and manufacturing
defect case. The plaintiffs in Kumho had brought suit after a tire on a
minivan blew out causing the vehicle to overturn.270  They alleged the
accident was caused by defects in the tire's design and/or manufacture.'
The plaintiffs rested their case on the testimony of an expert in tire failure
analysis who opined a defect did, in fact, cause the blowout.2 72 The court
excluded the expert after applying the relevant Daubert factors to the case
and concluding they weighed against the reliability of the expert's
methods. 73 The Eleventh Circuit reversed on the basis that the district court
had erred in applying Daubert because the evidence at issue in the case was
technical, not scientific evidence.27 4 The Supreme Court reversed the circuit
court's opinion stating it "would prove difficult, if not impossible, for judges
to administer evidentiary rules under which a gatekeeping obligation
depended upon a distinction between 'scientific' knowledge and 'technical'
or 'other specialized' knowledge. ' ' 27 5  All of the cases that form the
population from which the research sample was drawn for the present study
qualified for inclusion as a result of the decision in Kumho. With that in
mind, we now turn to examining how other design and manufacturing defect
cases have been decided since Kumho altered the landscape so dramatically.
Beyond the Kumho decision, five Daubert claims from four cases dealt
with expert testimony on the existence of defects in both a product's design
and manufacture.276 So long as the expert at issue was properly qualified to
give an opinion and had provided the court with sufficient evidence to
establish a reliable methodology, the courts in the research sample always
admitted such testimony. For example, in Rudd v. General Motors Corp.,277
the plaintiff was injured when the fan blade in his truck broke loose and
struck him in the head, neck, and arm. The plaintiff claimed his injuries
occurred as a result of defects in the fan blade's design and manufacture.27 8
One of the experts offered by the plaintiff to establish causation was a
mechanical engineer whose expertise was in failure analysis. 27 9 This expert
concluded to a reasonable degree of engineering certainty "that the fan metal




273. Id. at 145
274. Carmichael v. Samyang Tire, Inc., 131 F.3d 1433, 1436-37 (11 th Cir. 1997).
275. Kumho, 526 U.S. at 148.
276 Fee v. Brass Eagle, Inc., 2002 WL 1465762 (N.D. Ohio 2002); Tolliver v. Naor, 2001 WL
1345735 (E.D. La. 2001); Mannix v. Chrysler Corp., 2001 WL 477291 (E.D.N.Y. 2001); Rudd v.
Gen. Motors Corp., 127 F. Supp. 2d 1330 (M.D. Ala. 2001).
277. 127 F. Supp. 2d 1330 (M.D. Ala. 2001).
278. Id. at 1332.
279. Id. at 1338.
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because he had gone through a process of eliminating the alternative
explanations., 280  Although the expert was unable to provide any direct
evidence of such a defect, he was permitted to testify."'
[H]is testimony is replete with circumstantial evidence that -
through a process of eliminating alternative explanations - might
support a finding of a manufacturing defect. [His] testimony offers a
list of alternative possible causes of a metal-fatigue fracture, a
description of the physical indicia of alternative causes, and a claim
that his physical examination revealed an absence of any of the
physical indicia of alternative causes.282
The court also concluded that the expert testimony was based upon
sufficient data, reliable principles and methods, and reliable application of
the methods to the facts.
283
Mannix v. Chrysler Corp.284 stands in contrast to Rudd in demonstrating
the exclusion of experts when the court finds they used unreliable methods.
In Mannix, the plaintiff was severely burned after the vehicle he was riding
in burst into flames upon colliding with another automobile. 285 The plaintiff
alleged that the fire was caused by defects in the airbag system and proffered
an expert to support this claim. 286 The expert admittedly had "never taken a
course relating to airbag design, testing or manufacture. '287 Despite lacking
qualifications, the expert concluded that there was a defect in the car. 288 The
court not only disposed of this testimony due to the lack of qualifications, it
also noted the complete lack of reliable methodology for basing the
opinion.289
He did not conduct any test to confirm his conclusion that an airbag
malfunction caused the fire, and when asked "According to your
theory, what caused the airbag to malfunction?" he replied, "I don't
know." When asked: "Is your theory that the airbag caused the fire
based upon any assumptions?" He answered, "Yes" and then "Can
you tell us what assumptions your theory is based on?" he replied,
"I would have to think about that at some length. 290
280. Id. at 1341.
281. Id. at 1342.
282. Id.
283. Id.; see also Fee v. Brass Eagle, Inc, 2001 WL 477291 at *6 (E.D.N.Y. 2001) (allowing
plaintiffs experts to testify in light of their experience in the forensic examination of firearms and
the fact that they had actually examined the gun in question as the basis for their opinions).
284. 2001 WL 477291 (E.D.N.Y. 2001).
285. Id. at *1.
286. Id.
287. Id. at *3.
288. Id. at *1.
289. Id.
290. Id. at *4-*5.
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3. Other Types of Defects
Six of the forensic engineering claims in the research sample did not
allege either a design or manufacture defect, but instead concerned other
things that went wrong with a product as was the case in Fee v. Brass Eagle,
Inc.2 9 Two experts were excluded by the court from testifying in a case
brought to recover damages for injuries allegedly caused to a child from a
spontaneous discharge from a paintball gun.292 Two of the defense experts
would have opined that the "trigger extension of the gun broke due to an
excessive or abnormal amount of force applied to that component. 2 93 Both
experts believed this to be the case since "the only way to break [the]
trigger.., is by having the [gun's safety mechanism on] and pulling the
trigger at a force that exceeds 35 to 40 pounds, which is not your normal
situation. 294  But the experts could not offer any grounds for their
opinions.295 Neither had tested the paintball gun at issue to determine the
amount of force necessary to break the trigger while the safety mechanism
was engaged. 96 The only basis for the experts' assumption was the
standards of the American Society for Testing and Materials. 97 Yet, there
was no evidence that the paintball gun was designed to meet these
standards. 98 Accordingly, their opinions were deemed to be speculative and
were excluded on that basis.
299
In Reliance Ins. Co. v. Keystone Shipping Co.,3°° an insurance company
filed a declaratory judgment action in which the primary issue in dispute was
whether damages to a ship were caused by normal "wear and tear" as
asserted by the insurance company, or by corrosion from biological
microbes as asserted by the ship owners.3 °1 A total of four experts were
offered from both parties to testify regarding the cause of damage.30 2 The
court excluded all three of the experts offered by the defense since all three
had failed to conduct a comprehensive inspection of the ship, had relied on
unproven methods in analyzing the ship's measurements and had relied on
theories that had not been reliably demonstrated to apply to marine
vessels.30 3 The court did, however, permit the plaintiff's expert to testify.3 4
291. 2002 WL 1465762 (N.D. Ohio 2002).
292. Id. at *6.





298. Fee, 2002 WL 1465762 at *4.
299. Id.
300. 102 F. Supp. 2d 181 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
301. Id. at 186.
302. Id. at 188-91.
303. Id. at 189-91.
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Not only did the expert's experience qualify him to testify, but also his
conclusions were based on standard analysis of gauging data, which is an
acceptable methodology according to the court.3 °5
V. CONCLUSION
A. Consistencies in Applying Daubert
First and foremost, courts are taking their gatekeeping responsibilities
very seriously when examining the qualifications of a witness to give an
expert opinion. There were several cases in the research sample in which
judges barred people with questionable or inapplicable credentials from
testifying.30 6 Yet, judges are being careful not to make such rulings
cursorily. They appear to be conducting the case-by-case analysis mandated
by Rule 702 by qualifying not only those expert with appropriate academic
degrees, but also qualifying those experts skilled in various forensic
investigative techniques by virtue of their training and experience as well.
30 7
Second, just because a witness is accepted by a court as a qualified
expert, does not mean the court will allow the expert wide latitude in the
scope of the testimony to be given at trial. Judges appear to be taking great
care to limit the scope of expert testimony to only those opinions properly
within the witness' field of expertise. Courts have become vigilant in
prohibiting even well-qualified experts from giving opinions that go beyond
data supported by their investigations and go into the realm of speculation.3 8
Thus, for example, medical doctors with specializations in forensic
pathology were limited to testifying with regard to the results of their
autopsies.3 °9 One was not permitted to speculate as to what he believed a
perpetrator might have been trying to accomplish by gagging a victim;3"0
another was not permitted to speculate with regard to results of toxicological
tests that were not actually performed.3 11 Similarly, qualified toxicologists
were not permitted to approximate blood alcohol concentrations by
reviewing the results of police-administered field sobriety tests,312 nor was a
304. Id. at 188-91.
305. Id. at 191.
306. See, e.g., Gates v. City of Memphis, 2000 WL 377343 (6th Cir. 2000) (excluding police
officer from testifying with regard to bullet trajectory analysis); Weisgram v. Marley Co., 169 F.3d
514 (8th Cir. 1999) (excluding fire chief from giving an opinion on whether a baseboard heater was
defective); Kinser v. Gehl Co., 184 F.3d 1259 (10th Cir. 1999) (excluding product safety expert from
testifying about design defects in the absence of design engineering credentials).
307. See, e.g., Fee v. Brass Eagle, Inc., 2002 WL 1465762 (N.D. Ohio. 2002) (allowing testimony
regarding alleged defects in a paintgun from a non-engineer with experience in forensic analysis of
firearms); In re Bonham, 251 B.R. 113 (D. Alaska 2000) (accepting non-CPAs as experts in forensic
accounting); Tolliver v. Naor, 2001 WL 1345735 (E.D. La. 2001) (accepting non-engineer as an
expert in an automotive design defect case in light of his experience in automotive design).
308. See infra notes 311-12 and accompanying text.
309. Id.
310. Schieber v. City of Philadelphia, 2000 WL 1670888 (E.D. Pa. 2000).
311. Verzwyvelt v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 175 F. Supp. 2d 881 (W.D. La. 2001).
312. See, e.g., United States v. Hom, 185 F. Supp. 2d 530 (D. Md. 2002); Virgin Islands v. Carela,
358
[Vol. 31: 323, 2004] The Impact of Daubert on Forensic Science
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
neuro-psychologist permitted to testify about toxicological causation of
neuro-psychological illness because he was not a toxicologist.
313
Third, even when an expert is properly qualified to give an opinion, and
further when the opinion is limited to the area of the witness' expertise,
consistent with Daubert's mandate, judges exclude testimony that is based
upon unreliable methodologies.1 4  So, for example, a CPA was not
permitted to offer an opinion on an alleged fraudulent accounting scheme
when there were factual mistakes in calculations and when there was
insufficient consideration of all relevant factors.31 5 Similarly, a qualified
expert in momentum analysis could not give an opinion as to the cause of an
accident when the calculations underlying the opinion failed to take into
account several important variables.316 And an engineer was not permitted
to testify about consumer misuse as the cause of a gun accident when he had
not actually tested the weapon in question.31 7
Given these three conclusions overwhelmingly supported by the data in
the research sample, it appears that judges are doing an excellent job in
consistently applying the Daubert factors to screen out unqualified experts,
speculative forensic scientific opinions, and opinions based on unreliable
methodologies.
B. Inconsistencies in Applying Daubert
Unlike the study that found only two limited exceptions to the general
rule of consistency in applying Daubert to judge the admissibility of
behavioral scientific expert testimony, 1 8 the present study revealed more
inconsistencies when examining how Daubert is being applied to forensic
sciences in the post-Kumho era. The first major inconsistency has to do with
expert testimony from forensic accountants or forensic economists
concerning the calculation of damages in civil cases.319  Some courts
prohibit any testimony from forensic accountants or economists on the issue
of damages calculations. 2 ° Other courts welcome such testimony.32 1 And
still other courts permit only general testimony regarding what should be
included in a jury's calculations for damages, but prevent the expert from
2001 WL 1825823 (V.I. 2001).
313. Louderback v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 26 F. Supp. 2d 1298 (D. Kan. 1998).
314. See infra notes 317-19 and accompanying text.
315. In re Bonham, 251 B.R. 113 (D. Alaska 2000).
316. Smithers v. C & G Custom Module Hauling, 172 F. Supp. 2d 765 (E.D.Va. 2000).
317. Fee v. Brass Eagle, Inc., 2002 WL 1465762 (N.D. Ohio 2002).
318. Fradella, et al., supra note 71.
319. See infra notes 322-23 and accompanying text.
320. See, e.g., Voilas v. Gen. Motors Corp., 73 F. Supp. 2d 452 (D. N.J. 1999).
321. See, e.g., Maiz v. Virani, 253 F.3d 641 (11th Cir. 2001); EFCO Corp. v. Symons Corp., 219
F.3d 734 (8th Cir. 2000): Coleman v. Dydula, 139 F. Supp. 2d 388 (W.D.N.Y. 2001); Walker v.
Yellow Freight Sys., 1999 WL 757022 (E.D. La. 1999).
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testifying with respect to any particular amount of damages. The rationale
for limiting damages testimony varies. Some courts so hold on the basis that
allowing such testimony would usurp the jury's fact-finding role.322 Other
courts reason that testimony with regard to specific figures lacks a proper
foundation, especially in wrongful death cases in which there is often no
way of knowing how a person's life would have progressed, thereby making
damage calculations speculative at best.323  Even when such expert
testimony is permitted by a court, there are inconsistencies in court rulings
as to what information the expert may base his or her calculations.324
The second inconsistency that was revealed by the qualitative content
analysis concerned from whom courts will accept testimony as to causation
of illness in cases where someone has allegedly been made ill by exposure to
a toxic substance. Ideally, such causation testimony should be provided by a
physician with expertise in toxicology. 325 A physician without expertise in
toxicology is probably not qualified to give such causation testimony.326 But
whether a qualified expert in the field of toxicology, who is not also a
physician, is permitted to give such causation testimony remains in
question.327
The third major inconsistency has to do with what type of testing is
required before an expert in forensic engineering is permitted to testify with
respect to a design or manufacturing defect. While it seems clear that testing
the alleged faulty product is necessary,328 actually identifying the specific
defect does not appear to be necessary. 329 Ruling out other potential causes
of an accident, even though there is not necessarily any direct evidence of
the remaining cause is acceptable to some courts, but at least one court
refused to do so without more evidence.33°
By far, however, the most inconsistencies are found in the area of
forensic identifications.3 3 ' Numerous scholars and at least one court have
questioned whether fingerprint identifications are sufficiently reliable to be
admitted under Daubert-Kumho.332 In spite of the controversy caused by
322. See, e.g., Smith v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 214 F.3d 1235 (10th Cir. 2000).
323. See, e.g., Schieber v. City of Philadelphia, 2000 WL 1843246 (E.D. Pa. 2000); Saia v. Sears
Roebuck & Co., 47 F. Supp. 2d 141 (D. Mass. 1999).
324. See Schieber v. City of Philadephia, 2000 WL 1843246 (E.D. Pa. 2000); compare with
Walker v. Yellow Freight Systems, 1999 WL 757022 (E.D. La 1999).
325. See, e.g., Louderback v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 26 F. Supp. 2d 1298 (D. Kan. 1998).
326. Amorgianos v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 137 F. Supp. 2d 147, 182-85 (E.D.N.Y. 2001)
(excluding causation testimony from plaintiff's treating physician and from a consulting neurologist
due to lack of expertise in toxicology), afftd, 303 F.3d 256 (2d Cir. 2002).
327. See, e.g., Plourde v. Gladstone, 190 F. Supp. 2d 708 (D. Vt. 2002) (rejecting causation
testimony from a Ph.D. in toxicology); Amorgianos, 137 F. Supp. 2d at 158-59 (rejecting causation
testimony from a certified industrial hygienist with both a bachelor's and master's degree in
environmental health, and a Doctorate in Public Health).
328. Fee v. Brass Eagle, Inc., 2002 WL 1465762 (N.D. Ohio 2002).
329. See infra note 332 and accompanying text.
330. See, e.g., Rudd v. Gen. Motors Corp., 127 F. Supp. 2d 1330 (M.D. Ala. 2001); Lauzon v.
Senco Prods., 270 F.3d 681 (8th Cir. 2001).
331. Saks, supra note 54.
332. See United States v. Llera Plaza, 179 F. Supp. 2d 492 (E.D. Pa. 2002); see also Faigman et
al., supra note 58. But see United States v. Llera Plaza, 188 F. Supp. 2d 549 (E.D. Pa. 2002); see
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that one case, courts have continued to be consistent in admitting fingerprint
identification testimony, even though the arguments put forth in Lera Plaza
I are well-founded and well-reasoned.333
A much more pronounced split on the admissibility of forensic
identification testimony can be seen in cases ruling on handwriting analysis.
Most of the time, handwriting analysis experts are only permitted to testify
regarding the "physical mechanics and characteristics of handwriting" and
"similarities between the questioned documents and defendant's known
exemplars.... Under this approach, experts are not permitted to offer an
opinion on whether there is a match between a known exemplar and a
questioned sample. In contrast to this approach, however, some courts allow
handwriting experts to offer such ultimate conclusions.335
C. Overall Conclusion
Consistent with the prior study of the way in which Daubert was being
applied to behavioral sciences,336 it appears that judges have been
remarkably consistent in applying Daubert to several types of forensic
science since Kumho made Daubert applicable to many areas originally
thought to be beyond its province when Daubert was first decided. This
consistency is marked when applying Daubert to truly scientific areas of
forensic investigations, such as with forensic pathology, forensic physics
(i.e., ballistics and audiology), forensic fire science, and certain types of
forensic engineering. But application of Daubert, post-Kumho, to the more
technical areas of forensic science, such as forensic accounting, fingerprint
analysis, and handwriting analysis has proven more difficult for the courts.
This is undoubtedly due, in part, to Daubert's factors for admissibility being
based on Karl Popper's notion of science - specifically on falsifiability. In
spite of struggling to fit technical forensic evidence into the scientific rubric
of peer review, replication, and known error rates as set forth in Daubert,
courts are doing a remarkably good job in applying Daubert fairly
consistently in the post-Kumho era.
also sources cited, supra note 58.
333. See, e.g., Faigman et al., supra note 58; see also Sombat, supra note 8.
334. United States v. Hernandez, 2002 WL 1335595 (10th Cir. 2002); see also, United States v.
Rutherford, 104 F. Supp. 2d 1190 (D. Neb. 2000); United States v. Van Wyk, 83 F. Supp. 2d 515 (D.
N.J. 2000); United States v. Santillan, 1999 WL 1201765 (N.D. Cal. 1999); United States v. Hines,
55 F. Supp. 2d 62 (D. Mass. 1999).
335. See, e.g., United States v. Paul, 175 F.3d 906 (11 th Cir. 1999); United States v. Gricco, 2002
WL 746037 (E.D. Pa. 2002); United States v. Elmore, 56 M.J. 533 (N.M. Ct. Crim. App. 2001).
336. Fradella, et al., supra note 71.
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